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This study examines the relationship between types of government and level of public spending. There are two
competing perspectives about the consequences of coalition governments for the size of public expenditures. The
most common argument is that government spending increases under coalition governments, compared with
one-party governments. Another line of thought contends that coalition governments are often stalled in the status
quo due to the veto power of each member.Our analysis of public spending in 33 parliamentary democracies between
1972 and 2000 confirms the latter argument that coalition governments have a status quo bias.We find, particularly,
that single-party governments are apt to modify the budget according to the current fiscal condition, which enables
them to increase or decrease spending more flexibly. By contrast, coalition governments find it difficult not only to
decrease spending under difficult fiscal conditions but also to increase it even under a more favorable context, because
each member of the coalition has a veto power.
This study focuses on the impact of the number of parties forming the government on the
overall level of public spending. The conventional wisdom is that public spending increases
as the number of parties in government increases.We propose another perspective, inspired
by the veto player model. According to that perspective, the number of parties in cabinet
affects first and foremost the government’s capacity to shift spending in response to a new
fiscal context. The implication is that coalition governments have a status quo bias,
compared to single-party governments.
The standard view in the literature is that public spending should increase with the number
of parties in government. The typical interpretation is that coalition governments are less
willing or able to resist pressures for more spending, the so-called common-pool problem.
Because the benefits of government intervention are more concentrated than its costs,most
groups have an incentive to push for more spending. The propensity to overspend should
be greater when the government is made up of many coalition parties, none of which wants
to take responsibility for resisting ‘legitimate’ demands, than when it is made up of a single
party (Kontopoulos and Perotti, 1999; Persson and Tabellini, 2003, pp. 26–7).
The argument is that if parties in a coalition government apportion the different depart-
ments among themselves, if each minister controls his or her own department (Browne and
Franklin, 1973; Laver and Shepsle, 1990) and if none of the partners is willing to take
responsibility for resisting demands from the other parties, the most likely outcome
(assuming that each minister prefers to have a larger budget) is for total spending to go up.
However, there is another theoretical perspective, provided by George Tsebelis (1995). If
each coalition partner has a veto power on the overall orientation of government policy, the
doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9248.2010.00842.x
POLITICAL STUDIES: 2010 VOL 58, 829–846
© 2010 The Authors. Political Studies © 2010 Political Studies Association
predicted consequence of a coalition government would simply be greater stability. The
presence of coalitions entails the presence of more veto players and the ultimate conse-
quence should be that it is more difficult to bring about change. Coalitions should have a
status quo bias. The impact of a coalition should be to pull governments towards no change;
it should put a brake on whatever direction a given government is impelled to move
towards.
The theoretical prediction thus hinges on the assumption that is made about the nature of
the budgetary process in coalition governments. If a coalition enhances the freedom of each
minister to increase his or her own budget, the consequence should be higher spending.But
if the existence of a coalition (and greater ideological divergence within a cabinet) entails
that it is more difficult to bring about change, because of the presence of more veto powers,
then the consequence should depend on the context. If the fiscal situation allows for greater
spending, the presence of a coalition should partially offset the inclination to spend more,
and so the net effect should be less spending compared to single-party governments. From
a veto power perspective, coalitions, especially if they are characterized by ideological
heterogeneity, should have a stabilizing effect. Governments that are tempted to increase
spending would be forced to increase less and those governments that have to cut would cut
less. The impact of a coalition should be to make it more difficult for a government to move
in the direction it is inclined to go.
We would argue that a crucial contextual variable that needs to be considered here is the
overall fiscal situation that a government is faced with.When a government finds itself in
a negative fiscal situation (a large debt or past deficits), it needs to redress the fiscal
imbalance; this usually entails cutting spending. On the other hand, if there is no debt or if
the government has been making surpluses in the past, there is little pressure to cut spending
and the temptation to increase expenditures may be irresistible.
Our general hypothesis is thus that single-party governments should be more capable of
responding to the fiscal context. In difficult times, single-party governments should be able
to make the tough decision to reduce expenditures. In contrast, under a coalition govern-
ment, reducing the size of expenditures is more difficult, since coalition partners must agree
on the necessity of fiscal responsibility, and each one may exercise its veto power. For this
reason, we would expect coalition governments to spend more than their single-party
counterparts in periods of fiscal imbalance.
This is only one side of the story. In the absence of fiscal constraint, one-party governments
would want to provide more public goods with the hope that this will make people happy
and that it will increase their chances of being re-elected. Coalition governments, however,
may be stalled by internal disagreements about how and where to spend, and the outcome
may well be the status quo. In a ‘positive’ fiscal context, then, coalition governments should
actually spend less than single-party governments.
The same logic applies to the exploration of the relationship between government spending
level and ideological distance among coalition parties. It is more difficult to reach consensus
on budget outlays under ideologically diverse coalition governments than under ideologi-
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cally cohesive governments. Under pressure for contracting the budget in fiscally difficult
times, ideologically remote coalition parties are less able to agree on where to cut and may
well end up not cutting at all. On the other hand, in fiscally stable times, the increase in
spending can be stalled because of the veto power of each member which may have quite
different views about where to increase spending. By contrast, ideologically cohesive
governments should face little difficulty in expanding or reducing the size of the budget.
A number of studies have confirmed the standard view that public spending increases with
the number of parties in government. Torsten Persson and GuidoTabellini’s (2003; Persson
et al., 2007) seminal research shows that public spending is higher under proportional
representation (PR) and that this is so because of the greater frequency of coalition
governments observed in PR systems. Likewise, Kathleen Bawn and Frances Rosenbluth’s
(2006) analysis of public spending in seventeenWest European countries from 1970 to 1998
finds a positive correlation between the number of parties in government and increased
public spending.We should note, however, that 70 per cent of the cases covered by Bawn
and Rosenbluth had fiscal deficits; this could be the reason why they observe a positive
relationship.
Other studies have shown the utility of the veto player model. Bawn (1999) provides
compelling evidence of the theory. She demonstrates that in Germany the Freie
Demokratische Partei (FDP),which was often the minor partner in government coalitions,
was able to veto spending increases in ‘left-wing’ or ‘right-wing’ areas proposed by its major
partner (SPD or CDU/CSU).
Tsebelis (2002) provides additional evidence in support of the veto player model by
examining the number of significant legislatures in Western European countries. He
emphasizes the ideological range between coalition partners as being a primary source of
veto power. He finds that as the ideological difference between coalition partners in
government increases, the number of laws adopted decreases.He concludes that ‘if there are
many veto players separated by large ideological distance, then legislation can only be
incremental. If an exogenous shock occurs, a government such as this cannot handle the
situation and cannot agree on the necessary policies’ (Tsebelis, 2002, p. 605). George
Tsebelis and Eric Chang (2004) provide further evidence for the veto player model by
exploring changes in budget composition. They find that change in budget structure,
which is measured by the Euclidean space distance between two consecutive budgets, is less
likely to take place when ideological distance between veto players is large.
Robert Franzese (2002) examines 21 developed countries in his comparative study on veto
players and political economy. He concludes that multiple veto players in governments
maintain the status quo. The empirical finding nicely supportsTsebelis’ veto player theory.
With respect to the size of government spending, Eunyoung Ha (2008) examines how the
number of veto players in government and the ideological distance between them affect the
size of welfare spending under the pressure of globalization. Her empirical analysis of
eighteen advanced countries demonstrates that the increasing effect of globalization on the
size of welfare spending is significantly offset by the number of, and ideological distance
between, veto players.
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We investigate the impact of the number of parties in government on total public spending.
We test a model inspired by the veto player perspective, which assumes that the impact of
the number of parties in government is to produce a status quo bias.1 More precisely, the
presence of coalitions weakens the impact of pressures for both increased and decreased
spending. The effect of coalitions (and ideological divergence) is conditional.We identify
the fiscal context as a crucial factor that induces governments to attempt to increase or
decrease public spending.We assume that it is easier to increase spending when the books
are in good shape and that a high debt or deficit forces governments to cut expenditures.
Single-party governments adjust their budgetary decisions in accordance with the fiscal
situation. Such adjustments are more difficult to achieve under multiparty governments
because of the presence of veto players with divergent political interests. Thus the size of
spending remains relatively unchanged under coalition governments.
Table 1 summarizes our theoretical expectations. The central hypothesis is that the impact
of the fiscal factor (the previous year’s deficit) on public spending is reduced in the presence
of coalition governments, because of their status quo biases. Such an argument has not yet
been tested on a large sample of countries.
Additionally, we investigate the relationship between size of government spending and
ideological distance among coalition partners. Our research should demonstrate that the
conditional relationship is not limited to the number of parties in a government, but holds
as well when ideological divergence among coalition partners is considered.
Data and Methods
The sample consists of 32 parliamentary democracies and the time period is 1972–2000. To
determine whether a country is democratic or not, we use Freedom House ratings of
political rights. Only countries that receive a score of 1 or 2 for ten successive years are
construed as democratic.We start in 1972 because this is when both Freedom House ratings
and fiscal data become available.
We focus on parliamentary systems. We want to determine whether the presence of
coalitions increases public spending, and it is only in parliamentary systems that it makes
sense to distinguish coalition and single-party governments.We follow the definition and
the classification proposed by Matt Golder (2005) and inspired by Adam Przeworski et al.
(2000). A parliamentary system is one in which the government serves so long as it
maintains the confidence of the legislature.
Table 1: Public Spending: Government Type and Fiscal Condition
Type of government
Fiscal condition
Good (surplus) Bad (deficit)
Coalition government Status quo Status quo
Single-party government Increase Decrease
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The dependent variable is the level of central government spending as a ratio of GDP.We
only look at program spending and exclude interest payment and military spending in order
to avoid outlier problems which might be caused by some countries spending extraordi-
narily large proportions on military spending.2 The data come from the IMF Government
Financial Statistics (GFS)Yearbook on CD-ROM.We look at central government spending
since we are concerned with the impact of the number of parties forming the central
government.
A close examination of the dependent variable alerted us to the presence of outliers in cases
of hyperinflation. This led us to remove cases where inflation was above 30 per cent. It is
difficult to put much confidence in estimates of government spending and/or GDP when
prices are climbing at such a pace.
Our most important independent variable is the number of parties in government. The
variable is self-explanatory; it corresponds to the number of parties involved in the cabinet.
When there is cabinet replacement in a year, we use the weighted average during the year.3
As indicated above, the conventional theory argues that the more parties there are in
government, the greater the propensity is to increase spending.We assume a more com-
plicated dynamics; the impact of having more parties in government is conditioned by the
fiscal context. Therefore,we include an interaction term between the number of parties and
the lagged government deficit (surplus) as a proportion of GDP.
We also create a variable measuring ideological distance among coalition partners.We gave
each party in a given cabinet an ideological score on the left–right scale. The ideological
scores were assigned on the basis of three studies: Castles and Mair (1984); Hubert and
Inglehart (1995); and Benoit and Laver (2006).We standardized ideological scores into a
0–10 scale and used mean scores whenever a given party had been rated by more than one
study.We identified the two ideologically most distanced parties in a coalition government
and calculated the absolute difference between these two parties. As in the case of number
of parties, ideological distance within a coalition is interacted with lagged government
deficit (surplus).
The model includes two socio-demographic variables: the percentage of the population
under 16 or over 64 and the annual change in per capita GDP. Lastly, we insert the lagged
level of government spending in order to control for possible autocorrelation in this type
of data.4
We test the hypothesis that the level of government spending is influenced by the number
of parties and ideological distance in government.We predict that the impact is conditional
on the level of government deficit/surplus. Unlike previous studies asserting that the
number of parties in government increases the level of spending independent of fiscal
circumstances,we expect multiparty governments with greater ideological divergence to be
more constrained to change things. Hence, in the presence of a large deficit, single-party
governments should spend less than multiparty governments where some veto players
oppose spending cuts. Likewise, ideologically cohesive governments should cut spending
more swiftly. Under a situation of government surplus, on the other hand, single-party
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governments can more easily increase the size of public spending whereas multiparty
governments experience a harder time increasing spending, again due to resistance from
veto players. In the same way, governments internally divided along ideological lines should
find it more difficult to increase spending than cohesive governments. As a result, the size
of government spending fluctuates in single-party governments with a cohesive ideological
stance according to the fiscal context whereas it stays relatively stable in multiparty
governments with diverse veto players regardless of the context.
If our hypothesis is correct, we should observe a positive effect for the main deficit/surplus
variable; that is, public spending should increase with higher surpluses (and decrease with
higher deficits). On the other hand, we expect a negative coefficient for the interactive
variable; that is, the positive effect of surplus should be weakened as the number of parties
in government and/or ideological divergence within cabinet increases.
Since our data are in the form of the time-series cross-section (TSCS),we are careful about
choosing the right model. As a preliminary step, we performed the Breusch-Pagan test
which confirms the presence of heteroskedasticity. Therefore, we use panel corrected
standard error (PCSE) estimations. These estimations correct for heteroskedasticity with
the consideration of contemporaneously correlated errors across panels. The model is based
on Ordinary Least Square with PCSE, as proposed and advocated by Neil Beck and
Jonathan Katz (Beck, 2001; Beck and Katz, 1995a; 1995b). Later, we also consider a fixed
effect model and compare the results. By adding country fixed effects, we eliminate any
possible bias stemming from unobserved cultural and institutional characteristics of each
country.We employ AR1 disturbances, since we find first order serial correlation after a
Wooldridge test.5
Findings
Table 2 shows the countries included in the analysis and Table 3 shows the distribution of
variables. Mean government spending as a percentage of GDP is 31.2 per cent. The mean
number of parties in government is 2.04 and 47 per cent of the sample is one-party
government. Ideological distance among coalition partners ranges from 0 (when there is
only one party in government) to 5, and the mean is 1.5. Most of the time, governments
face a negative fiscal context; that is, there was a deficit the previous year. This was the case
for 64 per cent of the governments in our sample. The overall mean is a deficit that
corresponds to 3 per cent of GDP, but there is a wide range of fiscal contexts.
Table 4 presents the regression results. The first column shows the results when number of
parties is considered and the second column shows the results when ideological distance
within cabinet is considered.6
The results are similar across the two estimations. The level of spending in the previous year
and the presence of a substantial fraction of non-working-age population both contribute
to increased public spending while a favorable economic conjuncture leads to relatively
lower spending, in a counter-cyclical fashion. The impact of these control variables is
consistent with theoretical predictions.
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Our main concern is the impact of number of parties under different fiscal conditions.Our
prediction is that the positive effect of a previous surplus (or, equivalently, the negative effect
of a previous deficit) is reduced under coalition governments. As a consequence, the main
effect of the deficit/surplus variable should be positive while the coefficient of the
interaction term should be negative, which is precisely the result that we get. The
implication is that when the government deficit is higher than 0.014, having more parties
in government increases the level of spending, and one-party governments spend signifi-
cantly less than multiparty governments. Once this threshold is passed, that is, when the
government deficit becomes lower than 0.014 or even becomes positive (a surplus), having
Table 2: Countries and Years in Data Set
Country Years
Australia 1972–98
Austria 1972–2002
Barbados 1973; 1975–8; 1985–9
Belgium 1972–88
Belize 1985; 1989–97
Botswana 1974–88; 1990–6
Bulgaria 1998–2002
Canada 1975–2000
Czech Republic 1994–2001
Denmark 1972–97
Fiji 1972–6; 1978; 1980–5
Germany 1972–96
Greece 1974–81; 1991–8
Hungary 1990; 1992–2001
India 1975–91
Ireland 1983–97
Israel 1973–7; 1979; 1987–2001
Italy 1974–5; 1979–80; 1986–8
Jamaica 1976–7; 1995–2001
Luxembourg 1972–92; 1995
Malta 1973–8; 1981–99
Mauritius 1981–2002
Netherlands 1975–97
New Zealand 1972–88; 1992–2001
Norway 1973–7; 1981–97
Papua New Guinea 1975; 1978–93; 1997
Slovakia 1997–2002
Slovenia 1994–2002
Solomon Islands 1980
Sweden 1972–99
Trinidad & Tobago 1977–81; 1994–5
United Kingdom 1973–99
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Obs. Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
Government spending as a fraction of GDP 544 0.312 0.084 0.118 0.564
Lag of government spending as a fraction of GDP 544 0.31 0.084 0.098 0.564
Lag of government surplus (deficit) as a proportion
of GDP
544 -0.029 0.049 -0.233 0.226
Number of parties in government 544 2.041 1.379 1 8
Annual rate of change in real GDP per capita (US dollars) 544 0.039 0.13 -0.244 0.439
Proportion of population aged under 16 or over 64 544 0.362 0.047 0.297 0.526
Ideological distance among coalition parties 428 0.802 1.282 0 5.2
Interaction between lag of government deficit and
ideological distance
428 -0.022 0.069 -0.38 0.266
Interaction between lag of government deficit and
number of parties
544 -0.067 0.123 -0.744 0.226
Table 4: The Determinants of Government Spending
PCSE PCSE
Lag of government spending as a fraction of GDP 0.927*** 0.894***
(0.019) (0.022)
Lag of government surplus (deficit) as a proportion of GDP 0.277*** 0.227***
(0.063) (0.044)
Number of parties in government -0.001
(0.001)
Ideological distance among coalition partners 0.002
(0.001)
Annual rate of change in real GDP per capita -0.036** -0.039**
(0.011) (0.012)
Proportion of population aged under 16 or over 64 0.009 0.037
(0.033) (0.045)
Interaction between lag of government deficit and number of parties -0.070**
(0.026)
Interaction between lag of government deficit and ideological distance -0.073**
(0.026)
Cons. 0.028* 0.026
(0.013) (0.017)
R-squared 0.889 0.890
Observations 544 428
Note: Numbers in parentheses are panel corrected standard errors.
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
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more parties in government implies less spending. Under this condition, one-party gov-
ernments spend more than multiparty governments. The same calculation can be applied
to the second column of Table 4 where ideological distance among coalition parties is used
instead of the number of parties. The result is quite similar to the result of the first model
except for a slight change in threshold. Now, the threshold is a deficit of -0.015, under
which ideologically diverse governments spend more than cohesive governments. When
the deficit level is lower than 0.015 or when the government begins to enjoy a surplus,
ideologically cohesive governments spend more than ideologically diverse governments.
The results nicely support our hypothesis.
We run a set of simulations to illustrate the implications of these findings.7 The results of
these simulations are presented in Table 5 and Figure 1. As the simulation results show,
when there is a very large deficit, that is, it represents 20 per cent of GDP (the observed
maximum is 0.233), public spending tends to be low (the overall mean is 0.29), but this is
particularly the case for single-party governments (0.27). In those cases, public spending
increases with the number of parties in cabinet, but this is only because the presence of
many parties makes it more difficult to cut. At the other extreme, when there is a public
surplus, the propensity to spend is much greater, but this is again especially the case with
single-party governments. Single-party governments under the highest surpluses of 23 per
cent of GDP overspend coalition governments by a large margin (0.36 vs. 0.31). Coalition
governments spend less, because there is a stronger resistance to change. What these
simulations indicate is that previous surpluses or deficits have a substantial impact on
single-party governments but very little on governments with three or four parties. This is
entirely consistent with the view that coalitions increase the number of veto points and are
biased in favor of the status quo, not in favor of higher spending.
Figure 1 presents the relationship between the number of coalition partners and a govern-
ment’s swiftness in adjusting spending according to the fiscal situation. The variance in
spending among single-party governments is quite large, representing big fluctuations in the
size of spending depending on the level of deficit. The variance shrinks as the number of
parties in a coalition government increases, and finally becomes almost negligible under
four-party coalition governments. The graph vividly corroborates the veto player model.
In order to illustrate more carefully and clearly the marginal effect of the number of parties
in a government coalition, we use Brambor, Clark and Golder’s (2006) simulation and
graphic method. As Figure 2 shows, the marginal effect of the number of parties decreases
as fiscal conditions improve. Both upper and lower bounds of confidence intervals are
positive when a government suffers from deficit, which implies that the marginal effect of
the number of parties is positive and significant. Thus, under government deficits, coalition
governments spend more than single-party governments. By contrast, under surpluses,
coalition governments spend less than single-party governments.
Figure 3 represents the marginal effect of ideological distance among coalition partners
depending on fiscal conditions. As we already saw in the previous graph, the marginal
positive effect decreases rapidly as fiscal conditions get better.
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Robustness Checks
In this section,we run a set of regressions in order to verify the robustness of our results.First,
we insert other independent variables thatmight explain the pattern of government spending.
Thefirst set of independent variables pertains tonational economic conditions,tradeopenness
and GDP per capita. The regression results are presented in the first and second columns of
Table 6.Per capita GDP has a significant and positive effect on the level of spending, but the
magnitude of the effect is small. The effect of trade openness is also positive.Nonetheless,they
do not change the sign or the significance of our most crucial variable, the interaction term
between the government deficit and the number of parties or ideological distance.
Table 5: Predicted Spending by Number of Parties and Level of Deficit/Surplus
Level of deficit
or surplus
Number of parties
in government
Predicted
spending
Difference in govt.
spending (single vs.
four-party coalition)
-0.233 1 0.268
2 0.283 0.046
3 0.299
4 0.314
-0.126 1 0.290
2 0.298 0.024
3 0.306
4 0.314
-0.077 1 0.300
2 0.305 0.014
3 0.309
4 0.314
-0.029 1 0.310
2 0.312 0.004
3 0.313
4 0.314
0.02 1 0.321
2 0.318 -0.007
3 0.316
4 0.314
0.068 1 0.331
2 0.325 -0.018
3 0.319
4 0.313
0.226 1 0.363
2 0.347 -0.05
3 0.330
4 0.313
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We also test the sensitivity of our findings to the inclusion of a major institutional factor,
that is, federalism. It has been argued that federalism limits the authority of the central
government particularly with respect to restricting sub-national governments’ economic
activities. The moral hazard problem faced by sub-national governments would lead to
increased spending and transfers of the costs to others (Rodden et al., 2002). Political
scientists, for these reasons, predict a positive association between federalism and fiscal
indiscipline, represented by high inflation, overspending and fiscal imbalance (Rodden
et al., 2002; Treisman, 2000; Wibbels, 2000). We include a federal state dummy as an
additional control variable. The federal states in our sample are Austria, Belgium,Germany,
Canada, Australia and India. Interestingly, the results show a strong negative effect of
federalism on government expenditure growth. But the most important result for the
purpose of this article is that the interaction term with number of parties or ideological
distance remains negative and significant.
Our data comprise a wide range of countries, unlike other studies that cover relatively
developed countries. Mindful of possible unstable spending patterns among less developed
countries, we restrict the data to only Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) countries. The results are reported in columns 5 and 6 in Table 6.
Among OECD countries, the interaction between the number of parties and government
deficit has the right sign though it is no longer statistically significant. But the interaction
between ideological distance and government deficit does have a consistent negative effect.
Figure 1: Predicted Spending by the Number of Parties and Government Deficit (Surplus)
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Next, we estimate fixed effects models. As briefly mentioned in the methods section,
cross-national studies always present a pitfall because of the uniqueness of some countries.
It is quite possible that unobserved individual heterogeneity such as cultural, institutional
and social uniqueness is present in our sample. For instance, some countries are prone to
spend more than other countries for various reasons including political culture. If this is the
case, we cannot assume that there is no correlation between the independent variables and
the error term, and this eventually leads to bias estimates. For this reason, we include
country fixed effects and compare the results with those from the previous model. The
findings are shown in columns 7–12 in Table 6.We did not perform fixed effect estimations
with the federalism variable, because ‘federalism’ is an institutional variable that does not
change over time.
Column 7 presents the results using the number of parties as a measure of the strength of
veto players. Our primary concern is whether or not any change takes place in the
coefficient or sign of the number of parties and the interaction term between the number
of parties and government deficit. The results are very similar to the initial findings.We also
find a very consistent result when ideological divergence is used instead of the number of
parties (column 8). The signs are correct and the interaction of ideological distance with
the government deficit is statistically different from zero. We also insert two additional
economic variables into the model (columns 9 and 10). Again, the results do not change
Figure 2: Marginal Effect of Number of Parties on Spending as Government Deficit
(Surplus) Changes
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much and even the magnitude of coefficients is very close. In the sample of OECD
countries, we find that the interaction term with the number of parties loses its significant
explanatory power as it did in the previous OLS with PCSE estimation (column 11).
However, when ideological distance instead of number of parties is used as a measure of
tension between veto players, the interaction term demonstrates a negative and significant
coefficient as we projected (column 12). Among OECD countries, it appears to be
ideological distance among coalition parties rather than the number of parties that creates
a veto game.We performed additional analyses only for OECD countries controlling for
economic variables and federalism. The results are quite robust.8
To summarize, our finding that the impact of coalition size and/or ideological divergence
on government spending is conditional on the size of the deficit/surplus holds remarkably
well under many different specifications. This provides strong support for the veto player
model.
Conclusion
The goal of this article has been to examine the linkage between the number of parties in
government and policy outcomes. The standard view in the literature has been that the size
of public spending increases under coalition governments. The findings of this article
Figure 3: Marginal Effect of Ideological Distance between Coalition Partners as
Government Deficit/Surplus Changes
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Table 6: Robustness Checks
(1) Other
economic
indicators
(PCSE)
(2) Other
economic
indicators
(PCSE)
(3)
Federalism
(PCSE)
(4)
Federalism
(PCSE)
Lag of government spending as a
fraction of GDP
0.888*** 0.853*** 0.910*** 0.848***
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
Lag of government surplus (deficit) as
a proportion of GDP
0.245*** 0.187*** 0.288*** 0.228***
(0.06) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04)
Number of parties in government -0.001 -0.001
(0.00) (0.00)
Ideological distance between coalition
partners
0.001 0.002
(0.00) (0.00)
Annual rate of change in real GDP per
capita
-0.032** -0.034** -0.036** -0.039**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Proportion of population aged under 16
or over 64
0.053 0.088 -0.006 0.019
(0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05)
Interaction between lag of government
deficit and number of parties
-0.070** -0.077**
(0.03) (0.03)
Interaction between lag of government
deficit and ideological distance
-0.083** -0.100***
(0.03) (0.03)
Lag of relative GDP per capita 0.000* 0.000**
(0.00) (0.00)
Lag of the level of trade openness 0.013*** 0.014**
(0.00) (0.00)
Federalism -0.007* -0.014***
(0.00) (0.00)
Constant 0.006 0.002 0.041* 0.050**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
R-squared 0.889 0.895 0.887 0.891
Observations 534 419 544 428
(5) OECD:
PCSE
(6) OECD:
PCSE
(7) PCSE with
fixed effects
(8) PCSE with
fixed effects
Lag of government spending as a fraction
of GDP
0.935*** 0.941*** 0.687*** 0.644***
(0.022) (0.023) (0.049) (0.056)
Lag of government surplus (deficit) as a
proportion of GDP
0.317*** 0.296*** 0.234*** 0.194***
(0.080) (0.050) (0.067) (0.053)
Number of parties in government 0.002 -0.002
(0.002) (0.002)
Ideological distance between coalition
partners
0.001 -0.003*
(0.001) (0.001)
Annual rate of change in real GDP per
capita
-0.036** -0.038*** -0.044*** -0.044***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011)
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Table 6: Continued
(5) OECD:
PCSE
(6) OECD:
PCSE
(7) PCSE with
fixed effects
(8) PCSE with
fixed effects
Proportion of population aged under 16
or over 64
0.226*** 0.294*** 0.305*** 0.303**
(0.066) (0.079) (0.081) (0.096)
Interaction between lag of government
deficit and number of parties
-0.051 -0.071*
(0.034) (0.028)
Interaction between lag of government
deficit and ideological distance
-0.091*** -0.107***
(0.024) (0.030)
Constant -0.053* -0.073**
(0.022) (0.025)
R-squared 0.914 0.924 0.994 0.994
Observations 356 324 544 428
(9) Other
economic
indicators
(PCSE with
fixed effects)
(10) Other
economic
indicators
(PCSE with
fixed effects)
(11) OECD:
PCSE
with fixed
effects
(12) OECD:
PCSE
with fixed
effects
Lag of government spending as a
fraction of GDP
0.687*** 0.644*** 0.773*** 0.772***
(0.05) (0.06) (0.061) (0.066)
Lag of government surplus (deficit) as
a proportion of GDP
0.219** 0.182*** 0.184* 0.232***
(0.07) (0.05) (0.086) (0.064)
Number of parties in government -0.002 0.001
(0.00) (0.002)
Ideological distance between coalition
partners
-0.002 -0.002
(0.00) (0.001)
Annual rate of change in real GDP per
capita
-0.040*** -0.039*** -0.040*** -0.042***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.011) (0.011)
Proportion of population aged under 16
or over 64
0.422*** 0.417*** 0.270** 0.263*
(0.09) (0.10) (0.099) (0.119)
Interaction between lag of government
deficit and number of parties
-0.065* -0.025
(0.03) (0.034)
Interaction between lag of government
deficit and ideological distance
-0.100** -0.080**
(0.03) (0.031)
Lag of relative GDP per capita 0.000 0.000
(0.00) (0.00)
Lag of the level of trade openness 0.025 0.021
(0.01) (0.01)
R-squared 0.895 0.995 0.995 0.996
Observations 419 419 356 324
Note: Numbers in parentheses are panel corrected standard errors.
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
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provide a different perspective. The results endorse the veto player model according to
which the main consequence of a coalition government, especially if it is ideologically
diverse, is to increase the number of veto players,which impels a status quo bias, as suggested
by Tsebelis (1995; 2002). Coalition governments spend more than single-party govern-
ments when they are in a difficult fiscal context, but they spend less when the fiscal situation
is rosy. It all depends on the fiscal context.9
One may raise the question why our result is strikingly contrary to the conventional
wisdom. For example, as we cited in an earlier section, Bawn and Rosenbluth find a very
strong positive impact for the number of coalition partners. One reason we can suggest for
this is that countries experience deficits more often than surplus. For example, 383 cases out
of 550 in Bawn and Rosenbluth’s sample experience fiscal deficit. It may be the case that
the presence of a coalition more often leads to increased spending but we would point out
that this is the case only because deficits are more frequent than surpluses.
This study is one step further toward understanding the behavior of coalition governments
under different fiscal pressures.We considered the number of parties in government and
ideological distance between coalition partners as a measure of veto players, which are
Tsebelis’ partisan veto players. In future research, it would be interesting to examine how
institutional veto players behave under different fiscal conditions.
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Notes
1 We follow Tsebelis (2002, p. 168), who argues that what matters ‘is not the relative strength of different parties in government or
parliament, but the fact that each of them needs to agree in order for legislation to pass’.
2 For instance, in the case of Israel, average military spending consists of about 30 per cent of total government spending.We also
performed regression analyses using total spending including military spending and interest payments as a dependent variable; the
results are quite similar.
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3 We used Keesings’World Archive for the analysis of government composition.
4 We tested the existence of multicollinearity among independent variables and we found none.
5 We use xtserial command in STATA and obtained F-statistics of 38.225 from theWald test, which far exceeds the significance level
at 0.05.
6 We do not include number of parties and ideological distance together in the same model because of the presence of
multicollinearity. Indeed, the correlation coefficient between ideological distance and number of parties is 0.71.
7 The simulation is based on the OLS estimation with PCSE in the first column of Table 4.
8 We do not report all the results here, but they can be obtained by request.
9 It must be noted that fiscal deficits are more frequent than surpluses. Therefore in the majority of cases, conventional wisdom and
the veto player model have similar predictions. Yet surpluses represent 36 per cent of the cases in our sample, and in those cases
the predictions diverge.
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